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Abstract
To support a freight carrier in a combinatorial transport auction, we proposes an exact and two heuristic strategies for
bidding on subsets of requests. The exact bidding strategy is based on the concept of elementary request combinations.
We show that it is sufficient and necessary for a carrier to bid on each elementary request combination in order to
guarantee the same result as bidding on each element of the powerset of the set of tendered requests. Both heuristic
bidding strategies identify promising request combinations. For this, pairwise synergies based on saving values as
well as the capacitated p-median problem are used. The bidding strategies are evaluated by a computational study that
simulates an auction. It is based on 174 benchmark instances and therefore easily extendable by other researchers. On
average, the two heuristic strategies achieve 91 percent and 81 percent of the available sales potential while generating
36 and only 4 percent of the bundle bids of the exact strategy. Therefore, the proposed bidding strategies help a carrier
to increase her chance to win and at the same time reduce the computational burden to participate in a combinatorial
transport auction.
Keywords: combinatorial auction, contract procurement, bid generation problem, bundle bidding
1. Introduction
1.1. Relevance of combinatorial transport auctions
In order to buy and sell services for multiple heterogenous transport requests combinatorial transport auctions are
used. On the one hand, combinatorial auctions are used by large shippers to buy their required transport services
from many carriers (Caplice and Sheffi, 2003, 2006; Sheffi, 2004). The shipper acts as the auctioneer and the carriers
are the bidders in the auction. In such a scenario, usually long-term commitments in the sense of a framework
agreement are negotiated. Real-world transport procurement auctions are voluminous, i. e., in a single auction some
hundred requests with an annual value of several million US-Dollar are allocated. Examples of companies that use
combinatorial transport auctions for this purpose are Home Depot, Wal Mart, Procter & Gamble, and Ford Motors
(Caplice and Sheffi, 2006). On the other hand, combinatorial auctions can also be used by carriers to implement
collaborative planning for a coalition of carriers (Kopfer and Pankratz, 1999; Krajewska and Kopfer, 2006; Berger
and Bierwirth, 2010). Here, the planning horizion is rather short-term. Transport requests are exchanged between
members of the coalition. The exchange can be organized by combinatorial transport auctions and the goal of the
exchange is to find an efficient allocation of transport requests to carriers.
In contrast to conventional auctions, combinatorial auctions allow bidders to submit bundle bids. A bundle bid
(also referred to as package bid) is a bid on any subset of the tendered transport requests. The bid price is the amount
of money the bidding carrier charges to fulfill all transport requests of the subset. Furthermore, bundle bids are all-
or-nothing bids, i. e., a carrier either wins all requests composed in a bundle bid or none. For this reason, carriers
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are safe to express their valuations for combinations of requests which usually differ from the sum of the valuations
of the respective individual requests. This is due to economies of scope and the effects of the compatibility between
transport requests. That is, the cost to fulfill a request significantly depend on the amount and characteristics of
additional requests a carrier has to fulfill as well, e. g. the requests can be executed at lower costs, if they can be
combined in a well balanced tour. Carriers benefit from more efficient transport plans and an increased planning
reliability which is enabled by bundle bids. What is more, the shipper has a significant potential to lower his total
procurement costs due to bundle bidding.
Certainly, the advantage to fully express valuations for request combinations poses a challenge for the bidders. A
bidder that does not submit bundle bids is no longer competitive. Determining the bidder’s preferences becomes more
complicated, because the bidder has to evaluate a huge number of request combinations which grows exponentially
with the number of tendered transport requests. In line with this, Plummer (2003) and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
(2004) report that real world carriers are often far from unlocking the full potential of bundle bidding. Furthermore,
the results from classical auction theory with single-item based auctions are difficult to apply to combinatorial auctions
with multiple items (i.e., transport requests). Therefore, we are interested in providing decision support for bundle
bidding in a combinatorial transport auction. We want to know: Which bidding strategies reduce the effort to calculate
preferences for all possible request combinations without lowering the chance to win in the auction? Furthermore, how
can we evaluate those bidding strategies by means of computational experiments and make them easily comparable
for other researchers?
If bidding carriers would know more about bidding strategies, they could gain several benefits. They could increase
the chance of their bids to be accepted during winner determination. At the same time, the effort to generated the bids
could be reduced. This could lower the entrance barriers for smaller carriers to participate in transport auctions.
Likewise, if the transport auction is used for collaborative transport planning within a groupage system, more and
more diversified carriers are able to cooperate and it may become easier to lift synergies. On the other hand, the
shipper benefits from more bids and in particular more competitive bids. Of course, from an economic point of view,
more competitive bids finally lead to a more efficient usage of the available transport resources.
To get more insights into bidding in combinatorial transport auctions, we formulate a bid generation problem for
less-than-truckload (LTL) requests and we study the interdependencies between valuations of request combinations.
Based on this, we propose three different bidding strategies. These are applicable without knowledge about bids
of rivaling carriers, i.e., we assume truthful bidding. The performance of the strategies is evaluated by means of a
computational benchmark study. The study is setup such that it is easily repeatable by other researchers who might
want to propose their own bidding strategies and compare them with the strategies proposed in this paper.
1.2. Review of the literature and contribution
Two main problems in combinatorial auctions are the bid generation problem (BGP) and the winner determination
problem (WDP). In the BGP, a carrier (acting as a bidder) has to decide on which sets of requests to bid. This includes
a valuation of possible bids and a selection of bids that are actually submitted. After bidding is complete the shipper
(acting as an auctioneer) solves a WDP, i.e., the shipper chooses a set of winning bids from the set of all submitted
bids. The WDP is usually modeled based on the set partitioning problem or the set covering problem. Designing a
bidding strategy depends on the used auction rules and the formulation of the WDP. Therefore, we start with a brief
review of the literature on WDP in transport auctions.
The formulation and solution of variants of the WDP in transport auctions still receives the most attention in the
relevant literature. In this class of NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems, the task of an auctioneer is to decide,
which of the submitted bundle bids should be accepted as winning bids such that the required transport services are
procured with minimal total cost. Integrating extensive real-world business constraints (e. g., Sheffi, 2004; Caplice and
Sheffi, 2006), considering transport quality by means of Pareto optimization (e. g., Buer and Pankratz, 2010b,a; Buer
and Kopfer, 2014) or taking into account stochastic effects (Remli and Rekik, 2013) are discussed. For a literature
review on winner determination problems see e.g. Abrache et al. (2007). Typically, WDP models assume that the set
of bundle bids submitted by all bidders is a given input parameter.
Compared to the number of papers on the WDP only a few papers deal with the BGP. The following approaches
deal with innovative bidding strategies on individual, non-bundled requests. Figliozzi et al. (2007) study a dynamic
vehicle routing scenario with bidding in a competitive environment. The sequential auction mechanism of van Duin
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et al. (2007) also deals with short-term excess transport demand by means of an online planning approach. Requests
are periodically announced by the shipper and carriers may bid on single requests. Garrido (2007) propose a double
auction format where shippers and carriers act as bidders at the same time. More double auction mechanisms for
transport requests are proposed by Huang and Xu (2013). Essentially, a multi-unit auction is performed for each
request. As the mechanisms are incentive compatible, the best strategy for each bidder is to bid truthfully. Xu and
Huang (2013) advance their double auction mechanisms in order to cope with a dynamic environment. However, all
these approaches are concerned with bidding on individual requests and do not support bundle bidding.
Bundle bidding strategies may be distinguished between strategies that are independent of the rivaling bidders’
valuations and strategies that do require information about the rivaling bidders’ valuations. For the latter, the amount
of required information may vary significantly. While some strategies require complete information, i.e., the pref-
erence function to calculate all bids, other estimate the prices of individual requests or a few request combinations
only.
Complete information approaches require that carriers are willing to share sensitive data (e.g. utilization of vehicle
fleet, cost rates, or operational constraints) with the auctioneer. Alternatively, the auctioneer may estimate such
information. In the end, the bid price is calculated by the auctioneer and not by the carrier (Chen et al., 2009;
Beil et al., 2007). Possible scenarios are the ex ante existence of framework agreements that already specify which
resources a carrier has to provide; here, the auction is used for operational fine-tuning. Also, a setting were carriers
have very high incentives to collaborate applies. For example, because the carriers’ do not represent independent
companies but profit centers of a single company which are more open for sharing sensitive data, e.g. as considered
in Krajewska et al. (2008).
The following bidding strategies require some information (deterministic or stochastic) on the valuations of rival-
ing carriers. Lee et al. (2007) propose a quadratically constrained formulation of a BGP. The model assumes a multiple
round combinatorial auction. For each request, an ask prices announced by the auctioneer (see Kwon et al., 2005)
is given. Although the assumptions about bundle valuations are not made by the bidders, the bidders’ require the ask
prices from auctioneer in order to decide about their own bid. The efficiency and effectiveness of solution techniques
that compute a bundle bid are evaluated. However, the study does not go beyond that point and does not focus on the
performance of the computed bids in an auction setting. Bichler et al. (2009) analyse iterative combinatorial auctions
with respect to the allocative efficiency and utility distribution between the auctioneer and the bidders. Nevertheless,
six different bidding strategies are presented and compared. These are based on a generic value model and the ask
prices announced by the auctioneer. Furthermore, the used WDP assumes, at most one bid per bidder may win. For
these reasons, the focus is rather on the selection of bids as well as on the evaluation of the auction mechanism.
Triki et al. (2014) present a stochastic optimization model that requires assumptions about the cheapest price
for each subset of requests offered by some rivaling bidders. These prices are considered stochastic. Stochastic
optimization is used to calculate a single bundle bid together with a bid price. This bid is expected to maximize the
bidder’s profit. The model may be solved repeatedly, if multiple bundle bids are required. An et al. (2005) propose
two domain independent bundle bidding strategies. The bidder’s valuation for each item as well as her synergy
value for each pair of items are given. With it, the valuations for the most promising set of items are calculated.
While one strategy requires information on the single-item valuation of rivaling bidders, the other strategy requires
no information on the valuations of rivaling bidders. Both strategies are compared, among others, with a strategy that
enumerates the complete set of bundle bids. At this, auctions with up to 10 items are considered.
Finally, there are bidding strategies that work independent of the valuations of rivaling carriers. The strategies
are truthful, because the carrier bids according to her true valuations. However, this is not always enforced by an
incentive compatible auction mechanism for which truthful bidding is the dominant strategy. Rather, it is due to the
complexity of the BGP in transport auctions which also makes systematic cheating a nontrivial task. Schönberger and
Kopfer (2004) study an auction-based request reallocation mechanism for a coalition of carriers. Tendered are those
requests which are not profitable for an individual carrier. A bid is generated by solving a pickup and delivery selection
problem which maximizes the carrier’s profit. All new requests in the solution are combined into a bundle bid and the
charged price equals the marginal increase of the carrier’s profit. The evaluation focuses on the increase in the total
profit of a coalition of carriers but not on the performance of the bidding strategy. Song and Regan (2005) consider
the procurement of full truckload pick up and delivery requests. To generate bids, a truckload vehicle routing problem
which minimizes the empty movement costs is solved. Each tour of this solution is interpreted as a candidate bid; the
bid price corresponds to the empty movement costs. To select bids from the set of candidate bids that are actually
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submitted to the auctioneer, a set covering problem is solved which minimizes the sum of the prices of the selected
bids and ensures that on each tendered request at least on bid is submitted. The latter constraint might be unnecessary
in other transport auction scenarios, as it is often not required the each carrier provides a bids on each request. To
evaluate the strategies, two agents compete against each other in a computational simulation of an auction with four
to ten requests. Wang and Xia (2005) explain first-order and second-order synergies between set of requests and they
present the notion of a carrier’s set of optimal bundle bids. However, the synergy notions are neither implemented in
the two bidding strategies and therefore not evaluated. Chang (2009) considers the BGP in a full-truckload scenario
and models the problem as a variant of the minimum cost flow problem with pairwise synergies between arcs. The
evaluation focuses on the performance of the proposed method to solve the synergistic flow problem. However, it is
not studied how competitive the generated bids are in an auction setting, which is the focus of our paper.
The contribution of this paper is to propose three strategies for bidding in a combinatorial transport auction that
require no information about the valuation of rivaling bidders. The competitiveness of the bundle bids generated by
the strategies are evaluated by means of a computational benchmark study. In detail:
1. An exact bundle bidding strategy is proposed. With this strategy, a bidder always achieves the same outcome as
bidding on each element of the powerset of the set of requests.
2. A first heuristic bidding strategy is presented that restricts the search in the bid space by using pairwise synergies
between requests based on modified Clarke and Wright savings values.
3. A second heuristic strategy uses the capacitated p-median problem as a clustering approach to identify promis-
ing request combinations and to restrict the search in the bid space even stronger.
4. None of the strategies requires information about valuations of rivaling carriers. This is advantageous, because it
is very difficult for a bidder to estimate what prices rivaling carriers may charge for which request combinations.
5. The computational evaluation by means of test instances (see electronic appendix) is set up such that other
researcher can easily compare their own strategies with the results of the strategies presented in this paper.
1.3. Organization
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a basic bid generation problem from the
auctioneer and from the carrier point of view. In Section 3 we present an exact bidding strategy for a carrier. The
heuristic bidding strategies are introduced in Section 4. The performance of the three bidding strategies is evaluated
by means of a computational study in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and gives an outlook on future research
possibilities.
2. A bundle bid generation problem
A bundle bid generation problem (BGP) has to be solved by each carrier who participates in a combinatorial
transport auction. A carrier c has to decide on which subsets of transport requests to bid and which price to charge.
The goal of carrier c is to maximize her revenue won in the auction, i.e., the sum of prices of her bundle bids that
are accepted by the auctioneer. What makes the BGP difficult is the distributed nature of the problem. On the one
hand, there are rivaling carriers that submit competing bundle bids whose composition and prices are unknown to
carrier c, i.e., there is asymmetric information. On the other hand, the authority to decide which bids to accept as
winning bids lies not with carrier c, but with the auctioneer, i.e., there are multiple decision makers with a distributed
decision-making authority.
2.1. Assumptions on bidding and winner determination in a combinatorial transport auction
The process of a transport auction is shown by Figure 1. Rectangles represent optimization problems, rounded
rectangles show problem data, and edges represent input-output relations. A directed edge from a data box to a
problem box indicates that the data is required as input parameter to solve the problem. Vice versa, an edge from a
problem box to a data box indicates that the solution of the optimization problem provides the data. So, the auctioneer
announces the set R of tendered requests which is used as input data by the bidders. Each of the n bidders solves
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requests R
BGP of
carrier 1
BGP of
carrier . . .
BGP of
carrier n
bundle bids
B1
bundle bids
B...
bundle bids
Bn
auctioneer’s
winner
determination
problem
winning bids W
W ⊂ B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bn
Figure 1: Selected problems and decision makers in combinatorial transport auctions.
her BGP, the outcome for each bidder i is a set Bi of bundle bids. To decide which bundle bid is a winning bid,
the auctioneer solves a WDP; the solution of the WDP is a set W of winning bids, which is a subset of the set
B := B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bn of all bids in the auction.
We take the point of view of a single carrier and study her bidding strategy, i.e., the way she solves the BGP. The
hatched area in Figure 1 highlights the problem and the data which are controlled by this carrier. The main problem is
of course, that the success of the bidding strategy depends both on the rivaling bids and on the winner determination
decision of the auctioneer, which both lie not in the circle of influence of the carrier at hand.
With respect to the auction setting, we assume the following.
• Bundle bidding is allowed. A bundle bid b is defined as a triple (cb, pb,Rb). The carrier cb offers to perform
the set Rb of requests for the price pb ∈ N. The set Rb is any non-empty subset of the set of tendered requests
(Rb ⊆ R,Rb , ∅). Let P(R) denote the powerset of R without the empty set.
• A carrier may bid on each element of P(R). The cardinality of P(R) is 2|R| − 1.
• Bidders bid truthfully. The price of a bundle bid reflects the true valuations of the bidder and there is no strategic
bidding. From this follows, that each carrier looks only on her own and she makes no assumptions on the bids
of rivaling carriers.
• Bidders submit OR-bids. Nisan (2000) and Day and Raghavan (2009) discuss several bidding languages for
combinatorial auctions. Here, a bidding language is characterized by logical connections between the bundle
bids like OR or XOR, which allow the bidders to express different preference for combinations of bundle bids.
We use OR-bids, i.e., the auctioneer is allowed to select any subset of the submitted bids.
• The carriers use cost plus pricing. The price of a bundle bid is proportional to the costs of performing the
requests. Without loss of generality, we assume a markup of zero percent, i.e., the cost for performing a set of
requests are equal to the price charged by a carrier to execute these requests.
• The WDP of the auctioneer is formulated as the set covering problem. It is given by formula (1).
min
W⊆B f
a =
∑
b∈W
pb such that
⋃
b∈W
Rb = R (1)
The auctioneer’s task is to select a minimum cost set W of winning bids (W ⊆ B) that covers each tendered
request r ∈ R at least once. A set W of bids covers a request r ∈ R if it contains at least one bid b ∈ W with
r ∈ Rb.
For the transport auction scenario at hand we prefer a WDP-formulation based on the set covering model to other
formulations based on set packing or set partitioning models. WDP formulations based on the set packing model
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(see, e.g. de Vries and Vohra, 2003) are better suited for scenarios where the auctioneer wants to sell goods,
rather than to buy goods like in the scenario at hand. WDP formulations based on the set partitioning model
require that each transport request is part of exactly one winning bundle bid. However, given a set of bundle
bids B, the total cost of the optimal set W of winning bids under the set covering formulation is guaranteed to
be lower or at most equal than the total cost of the optimal set partitioning solution for B (de Vries and Vohra,
2003; Song and Regan, 2005; Buer and Pankratz, 2010a). This is clearly preferred by the auctioneer.
2.2. Assumptions on the tendered transport requests and the bidding carrier
We consider a shipper whose customers have to be serviced from the shipper’s warehouse by LTL requests. With
respect to the structure of the transport requests and the carrier at hand, our transport scenario is based in the well-
known capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) with the following modifications and additional assumptions.
• The shipper operates a single warehouse w from which a set V of customers has to be served.
• The relevant carrier operates a fleet of homogeneous vehicles. The capacity of each vehicle is cap.
• The shipper tenders a set R of requests. Each request r ∈ R requires a pickup of load at the shipper’s warehouse
w and its delivery to a customer location i ∈ V . We assume there is exactly one request for each customer, i.e.,
|V | = |R|. Therefore, requests may be also identified in terms of the involved customer location.
• Like in the CVRP, we assume LTL requests, i.e., each request r ∈ R includes a load lr (0 ≤ lr ≤ cap) which has
to be fulfilled by a single vehicle. However, unlike the CVRP, a vehicle has to pickup the load at the shipper’s
warehouse w and not at the carrier’s depot.
• Each tour (d,w, . . . , d) of a vehicle starts and ends at the home depot d of the carrier. Furthermore, a vehicle
drives immediately to the warehouse w after leaving the depot to pickup the loads required to service the
demands of the customers in the tour. In each tour, the home depot is visited twice, the warehouse is visited
once, and each customer is visited at most once.
• The carrier estimates costs by focusing on the tendered requests only, existing requests and possible future
requests by other shippers which may be acquire during the planning period are not considered.
Combinatorial transport auctions are often used to procure framework contracts for a longer period of several
month. In such a case the tendered requests may be simply interpreted, for example, as recurring requests during the
planning period.
With respect to the rivaling carriers, we make the same assumptions. Therefore, the competitive differences of
the carriers are only caused by their different depot locations in relation to the shipper’s warehouse and the shipper’s
customers locations. For our computational study, we consider these aspects during the generation of test instances
as described in Section 5.2. Due to the instance generation procedure, we can simplify the problem by setting the
distance of the shipper’s warehouse and the carrier’s depot at hand to zero. Without loss of generality, this allows the
use of sophisticated standard solution procedures which eases the computational experiments.
2.3. Bid generation problem of an omniscient carrier
Provided that the carrier at hand knew the bundle bids submitted by her rivaling carriers she could examine the
chances of winning in the auction by means of the model given by the bid generation problem of an omniscient
carrier (BGPO) as defined in (2) – (4). Although it is not possible for the carrier to use this model directly – due to
information asymmetry and lacking decision authority – we use to clarify the optimization problem and to evaluate
the proposed bidding strategies (cf. Section 5).
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For the BGPO, the set of bundle bids B is partitioned into two subsets Bc and Br with Bc∪Br = B and Bc∩Br = ∅.
Let Bc and Br denote the set of bids submitted by carrier c and by all rivals of carrier c, respectively.
lex min
W⊆B f
a =
∑
b∈W
pb, (2)
lex max
Bc
f b =
∑
b∈Bc∩W
pb, (3)
s. t.
⋃
b∈W
Rb = R. (4)
In the BGPO there are two objective functions which are lexicographically ordered. If carrier c wants to simulate
the outcome of the auction and design her bundle bids appropriately, she first of all has to take into account, that the
shipper will select bundle bids such that his total procurement costs are minimal (2). Under this precondition, the
carrier may then generate a set of bundle bids Bc which maximizes her total revenue won in the auction, represented
by objective function f carrier c. Clearly, both decisions are interdependent. Of course, in practice the set of bundle bids
Br submitted by rivaling carriers is usually unknown to carrier c which makes it even more challenging to formulate
an adequate optimization model for the BGP taking into account asymmetric information.
With respect to the BGPO the question is which set of bids Bc maximizes the winning revenue by carrier c? Under
the assumption of truthful bidding, the best chance to come out on top of the bids of rivaling carriers is simply to
submit all possible bundle bids (brute-force strategy), i.e., a bid on each request combination in P(R). This strategy,
however, is computational infeasible even for a small number of tendered request, because to calculate the bid price a
NP-hard vehicle routing problem has to be solved for all 2|R| − 1 request combinations.
3. An optimal bidding strategy based on elementary request combinations
We propose a bidding strategy denoted as elementary bundle bid search (EBBS). The outcome of EBBS is denoted
optimal (or exact), because it provides the same result as a brute-force strategy that bids on each request combination
in P(R).
3.1. Bidding strategy and bidding space
A bidding strategy φ in a combinatorial auction is a method that generates a set B of bundle bids. Considering
a truthful carrier c, a bidding strategy φc is a function on the set R of requests which outputs a set Bc of carrier’s c
bundle bids b := (c,Rb, pb), b ∈ Bc. At this, Rb is a subset of R and the bid price pb is calculated according to a cost
function p(Rb) ∈ N. Thus, the bidding function of c may be formally defined as in (5). For future reference, we omit
the superscript c for ease of notation because we focus on the individual carrier c only.
φc : R→ {b ∈ Bc|b = (c,Rb, pb) with Rb ∈ P(R) and p : R→ N}. (5)
The bidding strategy φ generates atomic bids only (Nisan and Ronen, 2001). Because the winner determination
problem assumes OR-bids, additional logical dependencies between bundle bids do not have to be modeled. That is,
the auctioneer can accept any subset of the submitted bundle bids; on the other hand, a bidder cannot enforce logical
constraints between atomic bids in the fashion of ’if you accept one of these bids then you cannot accept that bid.’
The bid space is P(R) ×N with a cardinality of |P(R)|. There will be at most one bid on each request combination
of P(R). In particular, it is not reasonable for a carrier to generate multiple bundle bids with different prices on the
same request combination A, A ∈ P(R). As each of these bids offers an identical set A of requests, the bid with the
lowest price dominates all other bids on A. Dominated bids will never be part of an optimal solution of the WDP.
The carrier uses her cost function p(A) in order to calculate a bid price for A ∈ P(R). The price charged for
executing the requests R is equal to the minimum cost solution of the VRP described in Section 2.2. Form this bid
price function, three plain bid strategies arise naturally. Given a set R of tendered requests, a truthful bidder could:
1. solve the VRP for R and submit a single bid on R only,
2. solve the VRP for R and submit a bid on each generated tour, or
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3. solve the VRP for each request combination in P(R) and submit a bid on each element of P(R).
As introduced in Section 2.3, the auctioneer minimizes his total procurement costs by solving the WDP given
by formula (1). The first strategy generates a single bid which is as efficient as it can be for the carrier at hand.
Nevertheless, it will be not very competitive in the WDP as it somewhat ignores the rivaling carriers which also
submit bids. In order to win any revenue in the auction, the bid of our carrier has to offer the lowest total costs for
R compared to all possible combinations of bundle bids which also cover R. This seems highly unlikely for larger
transport auctions.
The second strategy generates several bids which inhibit the same expressiveness as the single bid of the first
strategy. If all bids of the second strategy are accepted by the auctioneer, the assigned requests and the won revenue
are identical. With this in mind, the third strategy will be at least as successful as the first and the second strategy. On
the one hand, simply because the set of the generated bids are supersets of the bids generated by the fist and the second
strategy. On the other hand, because it generates more bids which offer a higher chance to be a good match with bids
of rivaling carriers. Of course, the computational effort for solving 2|R| − 1 vehicle routing problems is prohibitive
high considering the number of requests in many real world auctions. In the following, we develop an approach which
guarantees the same results as the brute force strategy but generates significantly less bids.
3.2. Relations between the valuations of sets of requests
Some terminology with respect to the relationships between costs for performing sets of requests are introduced.
First, performing an additional request always increases (or at least does not decrease) the total costs of a carrier. Let
A and B be two sets of requests (A, B ⊆ R). If A ⊆ B it follows that p(A) ≤ p(B). This relationship is denoted as free
disposal. The term originates from the point of view of an auctioneer that does not have to pay a fee for disposing
purchased items wherefore the auctioneer’s utility of receiving additional items given the same price (ceteris paribus)
never decreases. Due to the pricing function p, free disposal is a guaranteed characteristic of the scenario at hand.
Second, Nisan (2000) introduced subadditive, superadditive, and additive valuations between disjoint sets of items
in combinatorial auctions. We apply their terminology with respect to the valuation of request combinations from the
point of view of a single carrier. Let A and B be two disjoint subsets of requests (A, B ⊆ R, A ∩ B = ∅).
• If p(A ∪ B) < p(A) + p(B), the valuation of A and B is strictly cost subadditive.
• If p(A ∪ B) > p(A) + p(B), the valuation of A and B is strictly cost superadditive.
• If p(A ∪ B) = p(A) + p(B), the valuation of A and B is cost additive.
Under the conditions of the vehicle routing problem at hand, there are only additive and subadditive valuations
between sets of requests but no superadditive valuations. Consider Figure 2 with three requests a, b, c represented by
three customers nodes. Let A and B be two sets of requests with A = {a} and B = {b, c}. It is clear, that p({a, b, c}) is
either smaller than p({a}) + p({b, c}), e.g., when all three request can be performed in a single tour and a depot edge
can be removed. Or, if two tours are required to perform the requests due to capacity constraints, the total costs are
unchanged. Therefore, p({a, b, c}) > p({a}) + p({b, c}) is not possible, i.e., the valuation is not superadditive.
3.3. Elementary request combinations and elementary bundle bids
We show that given free disposal and the absence of superadditive valuations, it is sufficient to bid on subadditive
request combinations. We start by introducing the concept of elementary request combinations. A subset E of the
set of requests R is denoted as elementary if this set of requests can be performed by at most one vehicle, i.e.,∑
r∈E dr ≤ cap with E ∈ P(R). The set of all elementary request combinations is:
E := {E ∈ P(R) |
∑
i∈E
di ≤ cap}. (6)
Consequently, the set of non-elementary request combinations is defined as
E := P(R) \ E. (7)
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a
c
b
warehouse free disposal:
p({b}) ≤ p({b, c})
p({c}) ≤ p({b, c})
subadditive valuations only:
p({b}) + p({c}) ≥ p({b, c})
p({a}) + p({b, c}) ≥ p({a, b, c})
Figure 2: Example of relations between the valuations of request combinations
Table 1: Example of inferred information on bundle bids
Elementary bundle bids Inferred bundle bids
Rb used capacity p(Rb) R′ inferred prices for R′
{a} 0.8 pa {a,c} pa + pc
{b} 0.2 pb {a,d} pa + pd
{c} 0.5 pc {c,d} pc + pd
{d} 0.7 pd {a,b,c} min{pA + pb + pcC; pab + pc}
{a,b} 1.0 pab {a,b,d} min{pab + pd; pa + pb + pd; pa + pbd}
{b,c} 0.7 pbc {a,c,d} min{pab + pd; pa + pb + pD; pA + pbd}
{b,d} 0.9 pbd {b,c,d} min{pab + pd; pa + pb + pd; pa + pbd}
{a,b,c,d} min{pa + pb + pc + pd; . . . ; pa + pc + pbd}
A bundle bid b = (pb, cb,Rb) on an elementary request combination (Rb ∈ E) is an elementary bid. A bid on a
non-elementary request combination in E is a non-elementary bid. Note, an elementary request combination for one
carrier needs not to be elementary from another carrier’s point of view.
All elementary request combinations exhibit subadditive valuations. On the other hand, non-elementary request
combinations exhibit additive valuations. Superadditive valuations are not present in the scenario at hand. Therefore,
an auctioneer is able to infer the prices of all non-elementary bids of a carrier given that the carrier submits all
elementary bundle bids. To infer the price for performing a set R′ of requests (R′ ⊆ R) the auctioneer has to select a
cost minimal set W of bids whose request combinations is a partition of R′, i.e., the auction has to solve the following
set partitioning problem:
min
∑
b∈W
pb such that
⋃
b∈W
Rb = R′ and
⋂
b∈W
Rb = ∅ (8)
Table 1 shows an example. The auctioneer tenders four requests a, b, c, and d; seven subadditive bundle bids haven
been submitted by a carrier, the required relative capacity (with cap = 1) is given in the second column and the bid
price is given in the column p(Rb). Now, the auctioneer can infer from these seven subadditive bids the prices of all
remaining bids by solving set partitioning problems.
For these reasons, it is sufficient if the bidding strategy φ of a carrier takes into account all elementary request
combinations E ⊂ P(R) only, because the auctioneer is able to infer the bid prices of all non-elementary bids which is
always implicitly done during winner determination. That is, a bid strategy can focus on those request combinations
which can be executed by a single vehicle. This brings up another question. Do we have to bid on each elementary
request combination or can we exclude additional request combinations a priori, e.g., is it reasonable to focus on
request combinations which are performed in a highly efficient tour?
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Figure 3: Inefficient tours might still have a good chance of being selected as winning bid.
3.4. Focusing solely on efficient tours is not reasonable
The question is whether it is necessary to compute all elementary bids in order to achieve an optimal solution of
the BGP or does it suffice to submit a subset of the elementary bids to achieve the same outcome. The question is of
practical importance due to the combinatorial nature of the BGP. For a transport auction with fifty requests auctioned
and an average size five requests per elementary bid there are
(
50
5
)
or more than 2,000,000 elementary bids; with an
average size of ten requests per elementary bid there are already more than 10,000,000,000 elementary bids.
A natural thought to reduce the number of bids is to focus on those (elementary) request combinations that can
be combined in highly efficient tours. The idea is that an efficient tour leads to lower cost per request and therefore a
bid on an efficient tour is probably more competitive, i.e., it has a higher chance to be selected as a winning bid. On
the other hand, bids on (elementary) request combinations with a low utilization of the vehicle capacity or bids on
requests which are geographically distributed in an unfavorable manner are considered as inefficient. Although these
considerations are reasonable, one has to keep in mind that ultimately the auctioneer decides, by solving the WDP,
which subset of the submitted bids will be the set of winning bids. Therefore, efficiency of bids is predominantly
judged by the auctioneer taking into account
• the objective function and the constraints of the used winner determination problem and
• all bundle bids submitted by all rivaling carriers.
For the auctioneer, a bundle bid is efficient when it contributes to minimize the WDP’s total procurement costs. This,
however, does not necessarily imply that low utilized pendular tour might not have better chances to be selected as a
winning bid.
Consider Figure 3 with two carriers c1, c2 and five bids b1, . . . , b5. Carrier c2 bids on the set of requests {A, B,C,D}
and {B,C,D}. On the other hand, carrier c1 bids on {A} and {A, B,C,D}. Bid b3 = (p3, c1, {A}) can be considered as
inefficient. However, it complements very well bid b2 of carrier 1. Therefore, it has a good chance to being selected
as winning bid. Assume, carrier c2 with depot D2 submits a bid on request A which leads to a pendular tour
b1 = (p1, c2, {A, B,C,D})
b2 = (p2, c2, {B,C,D})
b3 = (p3, c1, {A})
b4 = (p4, c1, {A, B,C})
b5 = (p5, c1, {A, B,C,D})
Assume, carrier c1 with depot D1 submits a bid on request A which leads to a pendular tour with a low utilized
vehicle capacity of only twenty percent. Such a pendular tour is usually considered inefficient. From the point of
view of carrier, the construction of efficient bids does not necessarily increase her chance to win in the auction. As the
carriers is not aware of the actions of her rivals, the construction of efficient bids For a carrier, it is not a good strategy
to focus on the construction of feasible bids only.
From these considerations, it follows that focusing on the subset of elementary bundle bids on efficient (elemen-
tary) tours from the carrier point of view cannot be the optimal bidding strategy. Of course, this does not exclude an
adoption of these ideas within heuristic bidding strategies. Finally, like in most auction scenarios and in accordance
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request A B A ∪ B Z1 Z2 Z3
1 x x x x
2 x x x x
3 x x x
4 x
p(.) 2 1 3 3 2.1 1.1
Table 2: A ∪ B is redundant and less competitive than A and B.
to many real world auctions, we assume the bidding carrier does not have knowledge about the bids of the rivaling
carriers. Therefore we cannot use this information in order to identify a subset of the set of elementary bids which
leads to an optimal solution for the carrier. For the optimal bidding strategy under the assumptions of in the transport
auction at hand a carrier is required to generate all elementary bundle bids.
3.5. A tree search approach for generating elementary bundle bids (EBBS)
We propose a bidding strategy which is denoted as elementary bundle bidding strategy (EBBS). EBBS consists
of two phases. An overview is given by Algorithm 1. In the first phase (cf. Section 3.5.1), a set of all elementary
request combinations is generated. In the second phase (cf. Section 3.5.2), the price of each request combination is
calculated.
Algorithm 1: Elementary bundle bidding strategy (EBBS) – Overview
Input: depot node d of carrier c, customer nodes V , demand di, ∀i ∈ V
set of bundle bids: B← {}
R ← generateAllElementaryRequestCombinations(R, d) // with R ⊂ P(R)
foreach S ∈ R do
p← calculateBidPriceForAnElementaryRequestCombination(S , d)
b← (c, S , p)
B← B ∪ {b}
end
return B
3.5.1. Generation of all elementary request combinations
To generate all elementary request combinations E,E ⊂ P(R) binary tree search is used (cf. Figure 4). Assume
all requests are indexed in non-ascending order of their capacity demand, i.e., the sequence of requests (r1, r2, . . . , r|R|)
implies that dri ≤ dri+1 for all ri ∈ R.
Each node of the binary tree represents a subset S of the set of requests (S ⊆ R). The root node of the binary tree
represents an empty set of requests. The number of edges k on a path from the root to a given node i is denoted as the
level k of node i, the root node is level 0. The maximum level or the height of the binary tree is |R|. Let i be a parent
node on level k that represents S . The left child of node i represents the set of requests S ∪ {rk+1} where rk+1 is the
request indexed with k + 1. The right child of node i represents S in turn. In other words, on level k of the tree it is
decided whether request rk+1 is added to the set of requests represented by the parent node or not.
Because the requests are indexed in non-ascending order of their capacity demand, we can prune as soon as the
capacity demand of the set S of requests represented by a left node exceeds the vehicle capacity, i.e., we prune if∑
ri∈S qi ≥ cap. If the required capacity of the request represented by a node l exceeds the vehicle capacity cap
the node l and all its descendant nodes do not have to be visited, because they do not represent elementary request
combinations. The leaf nodes of the generated tree represent all elementary request combinations.
11
request i b c d a
demand di 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.8
{a, b}
0.9
{b} 0.2 {a}
0.8
{}
db + dc + dd
= 1.4 > 1.0
{b, d}
0.9
{b} {d} {}
{b, c}
0.7
{b}
0.2
{c}
0.5
{}
0.0
{b}
0.2
{}
0.0
b b
c c c c
d d d d d d d d
a a
a a
a a
a a
Figure 4: Binary tree search approach to generate all elementary request combinations.
3.5.2. Calculation of bid prices
According to the assumptions stated in Section 3.1 (in particular, depot d equals warehouse w), the price of bundle
bid equals the cost of performing all the requests of the bid. By definition, elementary request combinations can be
performed in a single tour, therefore we are not required to solve a vehicle routing problem but a computationally less
challenging traveling salesman problem. The problem of calculating a bid price p for an elementary set of requests
S ∈ E is to find the traveling salesman tour for S of minimum cost.
4. Heuristic bidding strategies based on promising sets of elementary transport requests
Although intelligent transportation decision support systems disseminate, the optimal bidding strategy remains
computationally challenging with an increasing number of tendered requests. Therefore, we propose two additional
heuristic bidding strategies. They are denoted as pairwise synergies based request clustering (PSC) and capacitated
p-median based request clustering (CPMC). Both seek to identify a subset of elementary bids which are promising.
Section 4.1 describes the common elements of both bidding strategies, while Section 4.2 presents PSC and Section 4.3
describes CPMC. Two random strategies are introduced in Section 4.4 for evaluation purposes.
4.1. General procedure
The basic idea of the heuristic bidding strategies is to generate only those elementary request combinations that are
supersets of promising request combinations (see Algorithm 2 for an overview). The bid price calculation is identical
to EBBS, however, the generation of bundle bids differs for the heuristic strategies. A set P of promising elementary
request combinations (P ⊂ E) is identified by first calling the procedure cluster. The following steps slightly differ
compared to the procedure of EBBS in Section 3.5:
• The procedure generateAllElementaryRequestCombinations is called for each S ∈ P.
• S is used as the root node of procedure generateAllElementaryRequestCombinations.
• The outcome of generateAllElementaryRequestCombinations is a set T of requests that is a superset of
S (T ⊃ S ,T ∈ E).
• The set union of all generated request combinations is denoted as R (R ⊂ E).
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Algorithm 2: General heuristic bidding strategy
Input: depot d of carrier c, warehouse w, set of requests R, vehicle capacity cap, demand di, ∀i ∈ R
set of elementary request combinations R ← {}
identify promising request combinations: P ← cluster(d,w,cap, R)
foreach S ∈ P do
R′ ← generateAllElementaryRequestCombinations(d,w, S )
R ← R ∪ R′
end
bundle bids B← {}
foreach S ∈ E do
p← calculateBidPriceForAnElementaryRequestCombination(d, S )
B← B ∪ {b} with b← (p, c, S )
end
return set B of bundle bids submitted by carrier c
The set of bundle bids generated by Algorithm 2 is always a subset of the set of bundle bids generated by EBBS. In
the following Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, respectively, we discuss different implementations of the procedure cluster
which identifies a promising set P of requests.
4.2. Pairwise synergies based request clustering (PSC)
The core of the strategy PSC is to identify pairs of requests that offer high synergies compared to other pairs of
requests. The idea is: if two requests i and j (i, j ∈ R) do not provide high synergies, then it is no-good to consider
supersets of {i, j}. Vice versa, if i and j already offer high synergies, then all supersets of {i, j} are worth a closer look.
Strategy PSC follows Algorithm 2, the cluster-procedure is implemented like Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: clusterPairwiseSynergies (PSC)
Input: depot d of carrier c, warehouse w, set R of requests, demand dr, ∀r ∈ R, threshold α
pairs of requests: R2 ← {S ∈ 2R : |S | = 2 ∧∑r∈S dr ≤ cap}
foreach S ∈ R2 do
σ(S )← (distd,i + distd, j − disti, j)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
distance saving
· (cap − di − d j)︸            ︷︷            ︸
idle vehicle capacity
with i, j ∈ S , i , j
end
return {S ∈ R2 |σ(S ) ∈ α-fractile of the synergy distribution}
Algorithm 3 looks at all
(|R|
2
)
pairs of requests. For each pair S of requests a synergy measure σ(S ) is computed.
Requests offer synergies, if they complement each other nicely, i.e., if they are cost subadditive. We say the synergy
between two requests i and j ({i, j} = S , i , j) is the higher, the higher the saved travel distance due to the combined
fulfillment of i and j is. Saved travel distance is measured by use of the well-known Clarke and Wright (1964)
savings heuristic. Furthermore, we say the synergy of pair {i, j} is the higher, the lower the required vehicle capacity
(cap − di + d j) is. Given a lower utilized vehicle, ceteris paribus, the chance is higher to include more requests which
complement the pair {i,j}. Finally, Algorithm 3 returns those pairs of requests that are among the α-percent pairs with
the highest synergy.
4.3. Capacitated p-median based request clustering (CPMC)
The second way to identify promising request combinations is borrowed from facility location. Facility location
problems address decisions about the location of facilities in a network and the allocation of demand points to these
facilities. Finding such an allocation corresponds to determining a set of clusters in a network which is why facility
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location problems are frequently used as clustering approaches. A well-known problem of this class is the capacitated
p-median problem (PMP). For an overview of model formulations and solution approaches see Reese (2006). The
PMP considers a set of n candidate points, each point has a demand. The goal is to find a subset of p points (p ≤ n)
which are denoted as medians. Each point has to be assigned to a median, such that the capacity of the median is not
exceeded by the sum of the demands of the assigned points, and the total sum of distances between the points and
their assigned medians is minimal. The solution of the PMP is a partition of the n points into p clusters. Here, we use
the PMP as an approach to determine elementary request combinations by interpreting the PMP as follows:
min
∑
i∈V
∑
i∈V
ci jxi j (9)
subject to
∑
j∈V
xi j = 1, for all i ∈ V (10)∑
j∈V
x j j = p, (11)
x j j ≥ xi j, for all i, j ∈ V (12)∑
j∈V
d jxi j ≤ cap, for all i ∈ V (13)
xi j ∈ {0, 1}, for all i, j ∈ V. (14)
The decision variable xi j defined in formula (14) represents whether point i is assigned to the same cluster as j
(xi j = 1) or not (xi j = 0). Point i and j stand for locations of customers (i, j ∈ V). In other words, if xi j = 1 then the
requests associated to customers i and j are part of the same elementary request combination. The objective function
(9) minimizes the total sum of the distances between medians and associated nodes. The costs ci j of assigning node i
to node j are represented by the Euclidean distance between customers i and j. Equation (10) ensures that each node
is assigned to exactly one median. Equation (11) guarantees that there are p medians and that each median is assigned
to itself. So, if x j j = 1, then point j is a median. Points may only be assigned to medians (12). The capacity constraint
(13) ensures that the total demand assigned to a median does not exceed the vehicle capacity cap.
PMP is NP-hard if the number p of medians is a decision variable; if p is given, PMP is solvable in polynomial
time (Garey and Johnson, 1979). Nevertheless, it is still difficult to solve even when p is given. We preset p to the
minimum number of medians which are required to solve PMP:
p =
⌈∑n
i=1 di
cap
⌉
. (15)
We can interpret a solution of the PMP as a set of elementary request combinations because all requests of a cluster
may be performed by a single vehicle. The heuristic bidding strategy that clusters requests by means of solving the
PMP is denoted as PMP-based clustering bid strategy (CPMC). Comparing the clustering approaches of the bidding
strategies PSC and CPMC, we expect the following differences with respect to the structure of the computed request
combinations:
• CPMC generates a significantly smaller number of request clusters than PSC. The number of clusters generated
by PMP is p, see equation (15). PSC, however, generates all clusters which lie in the α-fractile according to the
determined synergy distribution. For most values of α the latter will be significantly larger, since there are
(|R|
2
)
possible request clusters.
• PSC generates clusters which contain two requests. The number of requests in a cluster generated by CPMC
varies. Although a CPMC cluster may contain a single request only, most CPMC clusters will contain more
than two requests which together use the available capacity cap to large extend. This is induced due to the
definition of p and the solution of PMP.
• The sum of the demand of the requests in a cluster is higher with CPMC compared to PSC. Therefore, CPMC
clusters offer a lower potential to generate additional supersets of elementary request clusters.
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• PSC considers the carrier’s depot d and the shipper’s warehouse while generating promising request clusters.
CPMC does not exploit this information.
• CPMC clusters cover the tendered requests smoothly while PSC favors requests which are geographically closer
the to carrier’s depot and the shipper’s warehouse. The PMP-clusters are a partition of the requests, i.e., the
CPMC places at least one bundle bid on each request.
As this discussion of the structural differences between the clustering approaches shows, both heuristic bidding
strategies appear sufficiently different. It is hard to anticipate which of the strategies will be more successful in a
transport auction setting why we refer to the computational study in Section 5.
4.4. Random request clustering for evaluation purposes (R1 and R2)
For evaluation purposes we propose two random bidding strategies denoted as R1 and R2. R1 generates |R|
random bids. A random bundle bid (pb, cb,Rb) is a bid where Rb ⊆ R is generated randomly but the charged price
pb is calculated deterministic as described in Section 3.5.2. Starting with Rb = ∅ a request r ∈ R is selected with
probability 1|R| . Add r to Rb, if the vehicle capacity cap suffices to perform Rb ∪ {r}, update R := R \ {r} and update
Rb := Rb ∪ {r}. Continue extending Rb until the vehicle capacity is exhausted, i.e., dr + ∑s∈Rb ds > cap. Compute the
price pb for Rb according to Section 3.5.2. All in all, generate |R| random bundle bids.
The random strategy R2 follows Algorithm 2 like PSC and CPMC, however, it simply uses R1 as an implementa-
tion for the cluster-procedure.
5. Computational benchmark study
We evaluate the effectiveness and the efficiency of the proposed bidding strategies by a computational benchmark
study. For this, we take the bidder’s as well as the auctioneer’s point of view. The test setup and the used performance
criteria are presented in Section 5.1, test instance generation is described in Section 5.2, and the computational results
are discussed in Section 5.3.
5.1. Evaluation framework and test setup
The evaluation of heuristics usually involves solving a set of test instances and measuring the performance in the
light of the objective function values of the computed solutions. A solution of a bidding strategy is a set of bundle
bids. However, an objective function which can measure the quality of the generated bids directly is not available.
Therefore, we choose an indirect approach that takes into account the independent decision authorities of bidders and
auctioneer as well as the asymmetric distribution of information.
Consider Figure 1 again, the evaluation is aligned according to this auction process. There are n carriers, we
consider the point of view of carrier c. The test instances (see next section) include the set R of tendered requests and
the set Br of bundle bids submitted by the rivals of carrier c. In Figure 1 they are represented by the white boxes,
carrier c corresponds to carrier 1 and Br would be defined as B2 ∪ B3 ∪ . . . ∪ Bn. We apply a bid strategy to compute
the set Bc of bundle bids of carrier c. After that, the set B := Bc ∪ Br of bundle bids is used as input for the winner
determination problem (cf. Section 2.1) which is solved to optimality by the commercial solver CPLEX. The resulting
set W of winning bundle bids (W ⊂ B) and the set Wc of winning bundle bids submitted by carrier c (Wc := Bc ∩W)
are used to compute performance criteria.
Let Bφc be the set of bids generated by carrier c using bidding strategy φ ∈ Φ, Φ := {EBBS,PSC,CPMC,R1,R2}.
Let Wφ represent the set of all winning bids if carrier c uses strategy φ ∈ Φ. Then, the set of carrier’s c winning bids
is Wφc := Wφ ∩ Bφc .
Four performance criteria κφ1 , κ
φ
2 , κ
φ
3 , and κ
φ
4 are introduced to evaluate a bidding strategy φ. From the auctioneer
point of view, κφ1 measures how much using φ increases the auctioneer’s total procurement costs f
a(W) compared to
the exact strategy EBBS. Lower values of κφ1 are better. κ
φ
1 ≥ 0.0 is expected, because a heuristic bidding strategy
generates a subset of the bids generated by EBBS, which may only increase the auctioneer’s total procurement cost.
κ
φ
1 :=
f a(Wφ) − f a(WEBBS)
f a(WEBBS)
. (16)
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The remaining criteria κφ2 , κ
φ
3 , and κ
φ
4 consider the point of view of the bidding carrier c. κ
φ
2 measures the used sales
potential. The actual sales volume awarded to c when using a heuristic strategy φ ∈ Φ \ {EBBS} is set in relation to
the sales potential. The carrier’s sales potential is given by using the exact bidding strategy EBBS and summing up
the prices of c’s winning bids:
κ
φ
2 := (1 +
f b(Wφ) − f b(WEBBS)
f b(WEBBS)
) · 100. (17)
The success rate of a strategy φ, that is the number |Wφc | of carrier c’s winning bids versus the number |Bφc | of carrier
c’s bids, is measured by κφ3 :
κ
φ
3 :=
|Wφc |
|Bφc |
· 100. (18)
The ratio of the number of generated bids by strategy φ to the number of generated bids by strategy EBBSis expressed
by κφ4 :
κ
φ
4 :=
|Bφc |
|BEBBSc |
· 100. (19)
The computational efficiency of a strategy φ is measured by κφ3 and κ
φ
4 , while the effectiveness of φ is measured by κ
φ
1
and κφ2 from the auctioneer’s and the bidder’s point of view, respectively.
Finally, some remarks on the implementation of the bidding strategies and the used hardware. The bidding strate-
gies are implemented in Java 1.7. The Java code does not benefit from multicore computer architectures as paral-
lelization of code segments was not implemented. The prices of a bundle bid on an elementary set of requests are
computed by the TSP solver Concorde by Applegate et al. (2007). The winner determination problem is solved by
the commercial solver IBM CPLEX Optimizer 12.5. All computations are performed on a standard desktop computer
with Intel Core i7-3770 CPU with 3.4 GHz and 16 GB of working memory using Windows 7 as operating system.
5.2. Generation of benchmark instances
The bidding strategies are compared by means of benchmark instances. An instance consists of a set R of requests
tendered by the auctioneer and a set Br of bundle bids of the rivals of carrier c. Furthermore, the vehicle capacity cap
is given. All in all, 240 instances have been generated in which between 15 and 40 requests are tendered and up to
5000 bids of rivaling carriers are present.
The set of requests is implicitly defined by a depot node d and a set V of customer nodes, each with a required load
li (i ∈ V). The warehouse node w and the depot node d are set equal, as explained below. The distance between two
nodes is calculated as the Euclidean distance (L2-norm) rounded to the nearest integer value. The customer nodes and
demands are taken from the popular instances2 of the capacitated vehicle routing problem introduced by Christofides
et al. (1979). The first node of a CVRP instance is used as the depot node d. The subsequent m = |R| nodes of a CVRP
instance together with their resource demands are considered as the customer nodes of a BGP instance.
Each bundle bid b ∈ Br, b = (pb, c,Rb) of a rivaling carrier is randomly constructed as follows. First, the initial
empty set Rb := ∅ of elementary requests is extended:
Step 1. The predefined vehicle capacity cap is randomly reduced to cap′, cap′ ≤ cap, i.e., cap is multiplied by a
random, uniformly distributed number between zero and one.
Step 2. Draw a request r randomly. If r < R and the capacity constraint
∑
r∈Rb lr ≤ cap′ is satisfied, add r to Rb.
Step 3. Repeat Step 2 until a drawn request violates the capacity constraint for the first time.
2available at http://people.brunel.ac.uk/ mastjjb/jeb/orlib/vrpinfo.html, files vrpnc1.txt to vrpnc5.txt, vrpnc11.txt, and vrpnc12.txt
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Because the actual vehicle capacity is temporary reduced from cap to cap′ in Step 1, the method generates some
elementary request combinations with a low degree of capacity utilization with respect to the vehicle capacity cap. In
doing so, we do not have to make assumptions about the rivaling carriers vehicle fleet, their bidding strategies or their
already existing requests.
The price pb of a bundle bid b is calculated as the minimum length of the traveling salesman tour that contains
the warehouse w and all customer nodes associated with requests in Rb. The price pb is multiplied by a random
number that is chosen randomly from the interval [0.7, 1.3]. By this means, we cope with different depot locations of
different carriers without precisely modeling the rivaling carriers and their depot locations. As the test results show,
the generated instances are in many cases very challenging.
These rivaling bundle bids are considered as given. For the test it does not matter whether they reflect the true
valuations of the rivaling carriers or not. Because of the random variations of the vehicle capacities and the bid
prices of the rivaling carriers, it is highly likely that a bid generated by one of the bidding strategies at hand has a
different bid price than a given bid by a rivaling carrier, even if both bids are on the same set of requests. With this,
the assumption that all carriers are equal except for different depot locations is adequately integrated into the test
instances. Furthermore, this is the reason why we may simplify the bid price calculation of carrier c by setting the
physical location of the depot of carrier c equal to the physical location of the warehouse w.
5.3. Results and discussion
The detailed results for κ1, κ2, and κ3 as well as run times per test instance as well as averages, median, and
quartiles are reported in Table 5 in the electronic appendix.
5.3.1. Elementary bundle bidding strategy (EBBS)
For each of the 240 test instances we allowed a maximal computation time of 24 hours. Within the time limit,
the exact bidding strategy EBBS solved 209 out of 240 instances. Among these 209 instances, the bidder did not
win any business at all in 35 cases, i.e., f b = 0. That means, any truthful bidding strategy following the assumptions
of Section 3.1 will not be able to win any of the tendered requests in these 35 instances, because the competition of
the rivaling bids is too strong. Furthermore, none of the proposed heuristic strategies will generate winning bids for
these instances, because the set of bids generated by the heuristic strategies is always a subset of the bids generated
by EBBS. Therefore, we compare the bidding strategies on those 174 instances.
As expected, the computing time of EBBS reported in Table 5 in the Appendix increases with an increasing
number of possible elementary bundle bids per instance. The number of potential elementary bundle bids increases
with an increasing number of tendered requests as well as an increasing vehicle capacity cap. Higher values of cap
allow more requests to be serviced by a single vehicle. Therefore, the time limit of EBBS was exceeded for some of
the largest instances with 35 or 40 tendered requests and cap ≥ 60. Nevertheless, even some of the largest instances
with 40 requests and cap = 80 could be solved within a few minutes, probably because the distribution of the customer
loads allowed EBBS to prune early compared to the instances in which EBBS exceeded the time limit.
5.3.2. Comparing effectiveness of the bidding strategies
The effectiveness of a bidding strategy φ is measured by the used sales potential κφ2 . Table 3 shows the aggregated
results for each of the four heuristic strategies for κφ2 . Two effects become clear. In contrast to both PSC and CPMC,
the random bidding strategy R1 is not able to utilize the potential sales volume to a noteworthy degree for the vast
majority of the instances. Therefore, the performance of PSC and CPMC is more than simply bidding randomly.
Taking R2 into account, it also becomes visible, that generating random clusters of promising requests which are
used as a nucleus to construct elementary bundle bids (cf. Algorithm 2) is less effective. A systematic approach to
identify promising requests clusters as used by PSC and CPMC is meaningful and a crucial element for the design of
successful bidding strategies.
With respect to comparing the effectiveness of PSC and CPMC, PSC seems to outperform CPMC at least on the
coarse categories given in Table 3. To provide more insights, we visualize the individual κφ2 values for each of the 174
instances in Figure 5. The chart shows, for each bidding strategy φ, the obtained κφ2 values in descending order. Both
PSC and CPMC achieve a sales potential of for more than 100% for several instances (κPSC2 , κ
CPMC
2 > 100). How is
this possible and is it a good signal?
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Table 3: Distribution of the used sales potential for 174 tested instances
PSC CPMC R1 R2
# of instances κφ2 ≥ 100% 87 72 3 15
# of instances κφ2 ≥ 75% 136 103 3 21
# of instances κφ2 ≥ 50% 160 122 5 35
# of instances κφ2 < 50% 14 52 169 139
# of instances κφ2 = 0% 6 24 148 76
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
CPMC
PSC
R1
R2
Figure 5: Comparing the used sales potential κφ2 in percent for φ = PSC,CPMC,R1,R2
Recall, EBBS is denoted as an exact bidding strategy because it guarantees the same outcome as bidding on each
request combination in P(R) and not because it guarantees the maximum value for f b. A heuristic bidding strategy
φ that generates a subset of all elementary bundle bids may achieve higher values for f b than the exact bidding
strategy EBBS. EBBS generates the most competitive bids with respect to the request combinations and the charged
price. Depending on the set of rivaling bids, however, some of the EBBS’s bids could win even if higher prices are
charged. Therefore, the heuristic strategies might generate a higher sales volume compared to bidding on each request
combination which implies κφ2 > 100%.
With this in mind, however, a bidding strategy that generates values of κφ2 ≥ 100 percent is double-edged. On
the one hand, we prefer strategies that generate higher sales volumes f b and therefore higher values of κφ2 are always
better. On the other hand, there is no free lunch. Shifting from the static view on the issue to a dynamic view, the
portion of sales which exceeds the sales potential, i.e., κφ2 − 100 > 0, signals a competitive gap. This gap is not earned
systematically but based on fortunate circumstances with respect to the actual composition of the rivaling bundle bids
which cannot be influenced by the bidder. It also indicates the auctioneer overpays.
Looking at Figure 5 the strategy PSC is more robust than CPMC. PSC uses the sales volume more frequently, i.e.,
it achieves values of κφ2 near hundred percent with a higher frequency. Both methods solve a roughly equal number
of instances with a potential of hundred or more percent. Nevertheless, the CPMC-graph declines faster than the
PSC-graph. All in all, for about half of the tested instances, both PSC and CPMC achieve exactly the same or an even
superior outcome—with the discussed limitations—as EBBS.
5.3.3. Comparing efficiency of the bidding strategies
The strategies EBBS, PSC, CPMC significantly vary with respect to the computational times. Over all 209 solved
instances (including the 35 instances with f b = 0), the median runtime for EBBS, PSC, CPMC is 152 seconds, 9
seconds, and 3 seconds, respectively. However, the averaged runtime for EBBS, PSC, CPMC is 153 minutes, 20
minutes and 0.75 minutes, respectively. Strategy CPMC is an order of magnitude faster than PSC, and PSC is an
order of magnitude faster than EBBS. This effect may be attributed almost exclusively to differences in the number of
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Figure 6: Efficiency of PSC and CPMC.
generated bundle bids. The average success rates are κEBBS3 = 0.035 percent, κ
PSC
3 = 0.081 percent, and κ
CPMC
3 = 5.72
percent. Therefore, the heuristic strategies are a serious alternative to EBBS if the trade-off between used sales volume
and runtime are considered.
To gain more insights on the efficiency and effectiveness of the bidding strategies look at Figure 6. On both
diagrams, the abscissa shows the effectiveness measured in the used sales potential κφ2 . Higher values are better. Note,
a few data points with κφ2 ≥ 120 are not shown. The ordinate shows the efficiency measure κφ4 . Lower values are better.
Efficiency of a heuristic strategy is measured in terms of the number of computed bundle bids relative to the number
of bundle bids computed by the exact strategy EBBS. Each circle in the diagrams shows the results for one of the
174 test instances solved by the strategy PSC (left diagram) and by the strategy CPMC (right diagram). Circles in
lower-right area of a diagram indicate better results.
Strategy CPMC is more efficient than PSC. Although both strategies solve many instances with κ2 ∼ 100%, CPMC
requires less bundle bids to achieve these results. Actually, for most of the instances the number of computed bundle
bids is significantly less than five percent compared to EBBS. In contrast, PSC requires for all instances significantly
more than five percent of the bundle bids of EBBS. Averaged over all 174 instances, the strategy PSC requires only
36.1 percent of the bundle bids of EBBS in order to achieve 90.8 percent of the sales volume won by strategy EBBS.
The bids of strategy CPMC are even more efficient. On average, the strategy CPMC requires only 4.3 percent of the
bundle bids of EBBS in order to achieve 80.9 percent of the sales volume won by strategy EBBS.
5.3.4. Effects on auctioneer’s total procurement costs
The auctioneer’s total procurement costs are also affected by the choice of a bidding strategy. Table 4 shows
that the maximum increase of the procurement costs is about 11 percent if the carrier uses strategy PSC. The other
strategies CPMC, R1, and R2 provide an inferior worst-case performance, because the cost increase for each strategy
is about 25 percent. For the auctioneer, strategy PSC is more competitive than strategy CPMC which follows from
the mean and median values of Table 4. As the table indicates, the auctioneer will probably be able to significantly
reduce his procurement costs, if he provides advanced data and decision support tools in order to support the bidding
process of the carriers.
6. Conclusion and outlook
In order to support a freight carrier in a combinatorial transport auction we introduced and evaluated three strate-
gies for truthful bundle bidding. The bidding strategies help a bidder (i.e., a carrier) to decide on which subsets of the
set of tendered requests to bid. The bidder’s goal is to maximize the sum of the prices of those bundle bids accepted by
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κPSC1 κ
CPMC
1 κ
R1
1 κ
R2
1 κ
PSC
1 κ
CPMC
1 κ
R1
1 κ
R2
1
min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25%-quantile 0.0 1.0 2.9 2.2
max 11.1 23.1 28.6 22.4 median 0.8 2.8 6.3 5.0
mean 1.4 3.5 7.8 6.7 75%-quantile 2.4 4.9 11.9 9.7
Table 4: Increase κφ1 of the auctioneer’s total procurement costs f
a over 174 test instances.
the auctioneer (i.e., the shipper). All three strategies do not require information about the bundle bids of the rivaling
carriers which is advantageous because such information is often very difficult to estimate.
The bidding strategy EBBS is called exact, because it guarantees the same results as bidding on each request
combination in the powerset of the set of tendered requests. In contrast to such a naïve brute-force strategy, EBBS
computes a significantly smaller number of bundle bids by using the notion of elementary bundle bids. The exact
bidding strategy EBBS was motivated by showing that it is—given the transport and auction scenarios at hand—
necessary and sufficient to compute all elementary bundle bids in order to achieve the same outcome as a brute-force
strategy. The bidding strategies denoted as PSC and CPMC are called heuristic. The idea of these heuristic strategies
is to generate only those elementary bundle bids which are supersets of promising request combinations. Bid strategy
PSC identifies promising request combinations by measuring pairwise synergies through modified Clarke-and-Wright
savings values. In contrast, bid strategy CPMC identifies promising request combinations by solving the capacitated
p-median problem. The computational evaluation showed that EBBS may be used in combinatorial transport auctions
with up to 40 tendered requests. This is about twice the size of most previous truthful bidding strategies. On average,
bid strategy PSC requires 36 percent of the bundle bids generated by EBBS in order to achieve 91 percent of the
possible revenue. Bid strategy CPMC is more efficient, it computes only 4.3 percent of the bundle bids generated by
EBBS, but achieves 80.9 percent of the possible revenue. However, the results of PSC are more robust compared to
CPMC.
By showing that heuristic bundle bidding strategies are viable and proposing ways and means to evaluate the
performance of (heuristic) strategies for bundle bidding a basis for future research has been created. If we learn
more about promising request combinations and heuristic bidding strategies, carriers as well as shippers may benefit.
Carriers increase their chance to win additional business. The entrance barriers to successfully bid in transport auctions
are reduced, because the computational effort to generate bids decreases with more powerful strategies. On the one
hand, future research should study features of winning bundle bids and non-winning bundle bids in order to gain
more insights into characteristics of promising request combinations. The bidding strategies should be adapted to
other transport auction scenarios with, e.g., existing transport commitments, general pickup-and-delivery requests, or
requests with time windows. On the other hand, shippers also benefit from effective bidding strategies. Therefore,
shippers should provide tools that comply with the carrier’s private information requirements in order to support the
carriers to generate competitive bundle bids.
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